

## ON STRATEGY-PROOFNESS AND SEMILATTICE SINGLE-PEAKEDNESS

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We study social choice rules defined on the domain of semilattice single-peaked preferences. Semilattice single-peakedness has been identified as the necessary condition that a set of preferences must satisfy so that the set can be the domain of a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous rule. We characterize the class of all such rules on that domain and show that they are deeply related to the supremum of the underlying semilattice structure.