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Consider a society of n individuals with weak preferences over two alternatives. We characterize the class of anonymous, obviously strategy-proof and onto social choice functions based on extended majority rules, which can be expressed in terms of quota pair systems. In particular, we show that there exist six quota pair systems satisfying all three properties. For each one of them, we identify an extensive game form that implements the associated social choice function in obviously dominant strategies. This implies a significant effect of assuming obvious strategy-proofness, given that the number of such rules that are strategy-proof is 2^{n+1} . We also discuss the relation of these properties with efficiency.

Trabajo en conjunto con R. Pablo Arribillaga (Instituto de Matemática Aplicada San Luis, Universidad Nacional de San Luis-CONICET, Argentina).

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