Trade-off between manipulability and dictatorial power: a proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem

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By endowing the class of tops-only and efficient social choice rules with a dual order structure that exploits the trade-off between different degrees of manipulability and dictatorial power rules allow agents to have, we provide a proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem.

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