

# NASH IMPLEMENTATION IN A MANY-TO-ONE MATCHING MARKET

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In a many-to-one matching market with substitutable preferences, we analyze the game induced by a stable rule. When both sides of the market play strategically, we show that any stable rule implements, in Nash equilibrium, the individually rational matchings. Also, when only workers play strategically and firms' preferences satisfy the law of aggregated demand, we show that any stable rule implements, in Nash equilibrium, the stable matchings.

*Trabajo en conjunto con Paola B. Manasero (Instituto de Matemática Aplicada San Luis, Universidad Nacional de San Luis) y Jorge Oviedo (Instituto de Matemática Aplicada San Luis, Universidad Nacional de San Luis).*